internet messaging apps

The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warns that threat actors are actively abusing commercial spyware and remote access trojans (RATs) to compromise mobile messaging platforms. Rather than attacking the encryption protecting modern messaging services, adversaries focus on the endpoints where messages are created, decrypted, and stored. Once a device is compromised, attackers can monitor conversations in real time, steal credentials, harvest contacts, and impersonate victims regardless of the strength of the underlying encryption.

These operations have become increasingly common among both financially motivated cybercriminals and state-sponsored intelligence services. Mobile messaging applications now contain some of the most valuable information available to attackers, including personal conversations, business communications, authentication codes, shared documents, and location information.

Recent Attack Campaigns

CISA highlights several recent campaigns illustrating how diverse these operations have become. Russia-aligned threat actors have abused Signal’s linked-device functionality by convincing victims to authorize an attacker-controlled device through malicious QR codes, allowing long-term access to encrypted conversations without alerting the victim.

Researchers have also identified the ProSpy and ToSpy Android spyware families, which masquerade as legitimate Signal and ToTok applications. Once installed, these trojanized applications establish persistent access to the device while silently collecting messages, call records, contacts, photographs, and other sensitive data for exfiltration.

Another campaign, ClayRat, relies heavily on social engineering. Victims are directed through fraudulent Telegram channels and phishing pages impersonating trusted services including WhatsApp, Google Photos, TikTok, and YouTube. The infrastructure is designed to persuade users to install malicious software while believing they are interacting with legitimate online services.

Apple devices have also been targeted through sophisticated exploit chains. In one highly selective operation, attackers combined CVE-2025-43300 with CVE-2025-55177 to compromise fewer than 200 WhatsApp users, demonstrating that even fully patched flagship devices remain attractive espionage targets.

Samsung Galaxy devices have similarly been targeted through the LANDFALL spyware campaign, which exploited CVE-2025-21042 to deploy Android surveillance malware against carefully selected victims throughout the Middle East.

Primary Targets

Most observed operations focus on individuals whose communications provide intelligence or strategic value. Current and former government officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists, executives, diplomats, and members of civil society organizations remain primary targets across the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. However, history shows that techniques initially reserved for espionage frequently migrate into criminal operations once they become widely understood, eventually affecting ordinary consumers and enterprises alike.

Attack Techniques

While the individual malware families differ, their operational methodology is remarkably consistent. Most campaigns begin with carefully crafted social engineering that persuades victims to scan a QR code, install what appears to be a legitimate messaging application, visit a phishing website, or open malicious content delivered through trusted communication channels. Rather than relying solely on software vulnerabilities, attackers increasingly exploit user trust.

After gaining an initial foothold, the malware attempts to establish persistence, steal authentication tokens, collect messages and contact databases, monitor calls, record keystrokes, access stored files, and communicate continuously with command-and-control infrastructure. More advanced implants can also download additional malware modules, effectively turning an infected smartphone into an intelligence collection platform.

Recommended Security Practices

Because these attacks target both technology and human behavior, effective defense requires more than simply installing security software. Organizations should combine phishing-resistant authentication, rapid software patching, secure mobile device management, and regular user awareness training to reduce opportunities for compromise.

Core Security Measures

Users should enable end-to-end encrypted messaging services, replace SMS-based authentication with FIDO security keys wherever possible, store credentials in reputable password managers, configure carrier-level SIM protection, promptly install security updates, and avoid installing applications from unofficial marketplaces. These measures significantly increase the effort required for attackers to compromise messaging accounts.

  • Guidance for iPhone Users: Apple users who may face elevated risk—including executives, journalists, government personnel, and activists—should enable Lockdown Mode whenever practical, activate iCloud Private Relay, and regularly review application permissions to ensure only trusted software retains access to sensitive resources such as the microphone, camera, contacts, and location services.
  • Guidance for Android Users : Android users should purchase devices from vendors with strong security support lifecycles, enable Enhanced Protection for Chrome Safe Browsing, verify that Google Play Protect remains active, use RCS messaging only when end-to-end encryption is available, and periodically audit installed applications and their assigned permissions to reduce the attack surface.

Stopping the Attack Before the Device Is Compromised

Although many mobile espionage operations ultimately exploit vulnerabilities or abuse legitimate messaging features, the initial compromise frequently begins with a malicious file, trojanized application package, phishing attachment, or installer delivered through email, messaging platforms, social media, or fraudulent websites. Preventing those files from ever reaching the endpoint remains one of the most effective opportunities to break the attack chain.

FileDNA Content Analysis, Disarm and Reconstruction (CADR) technologies complement endpoint and mobile security by analyzing files before they reach users, removing embedded scripts, active content, exploit-bearing objects, and other malicious components while reconstructing a safe version of the original content. By eliminating weaponized files before they execute, organizations can significantly reduce the likelihood that spyware or remote access trojans ever establish their initial foothold.