Security researchers at Elastic Security Labs have uncovered a previously undocumented Brazilian banking trojan known as TCLBANKER, a malware family capable of targeting 59 financial organizations, including traditional banks, fintech services, and cryptocurrency platforms. The campaign is currently tracked as REF3076.

Researchers assess TCLBANKER as a major evolution of the Maverick malware family, previously associated with a threat cluster identified by Trend Micro as Water Saci. Earlier activity from this group involved the SORVEPOTEL worm, which propagated through compromised WhatsApp Web sessions.

Infection Chain and Initial Compromise

The infection process begins with a malicious MSI installer distributed inside a ZIP archive. The installer abuses a legitimate signed application, Logitech Logi AI Prompt Builder, using DLL side-loading techniques. This method forces the trusted application to load a malicious dynamic-link library named screen_retriever_plugin.dll instead of the legitimate component.

Once executed, the malware loader deploys two primary modules:

  • A fully operational banking trojan
  • A worm component designed for large-scale propagation and automated distribution

This dual-module architecture allows TCLBANKER to simultaneously compromise financial credentials while aggressively spreading to additional victims.

Advanced Evasion and Anti-Analysis Techniques

TCLBANKER incorporates multiple layers of anti-analysis and defense evasion mechanisms designed to reduce visibility and complicate forensic analysis.

Process Validation

The malicious DLL validates the parent process before execution. The payload will only activate if it is loaded by either:

  • logiaipromptbuilder.exe (the legitimate Logitech executable)
  • tclloader.exe (likely an internal testing binary)

This verification helps prevent accidental execution in analysis environments or automated sandboxes.

Hook Removal and Telemetry Suppression

The malware removes user-mode hooks commonly inserted by EDR and endpoint protection solutions inside ntdll.dll, replacing the loaded library entirely. It also disables Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), significantly reducing host-level telemetry visibility.

Environment-Gated Payload Decryption

A particularly sophisticated feature involves environment fingerprinting and gated payload decryption. TCLBANKER generates three independent fingerprints derived from:

  • Anti-debugging checks
  • System disk characteristics
  • System language configuration

These fingerprints are combined into a unique environment hash used to decrypt the embedded payload. If debugging or sandbox analysis is detected, an incorrect hash is generated, causing payload decryption to fail completely and terminating execution.

Regional Targeting

The malware additionally validates that the infected system uses Brazilian Portuguese as the default operating system language before proceeding, strongly indicating a focused regional targeting strategy.

Banking Trojan Functionality

After successfully passing its validation checks, TCLBANKER establishes persistence through scheduled task creation and initiates outbound communication with its command-and-control infrastructure using HTTP POST requests containing basic host information.

The trojan also contains a built-in self-update mechanism and continuously monitors active browser URLs through Windows UI Automation APIs. Supported browsers include:

  • Google Chrome
  • Mozilla Firefox
  • Microsoft Edge
  • Brave
  • Opera
  • Vivaldi

When the victim navigates to one of the malware’s 59 hard-coded financial targets, TCLBANKER establishes a live WebSocket session with a remote operator, enabling real-time interactive control of the infected system.

Supported attacker actions include:

  • Remote shell command execution
  • Real-time screen streaming
  • Screenshot capture
  • Keystroke logging
  • Clipboard manipulation
  • Remote mouse and keyboard control
  • File and process management
  • Active window enumeration
  • Deployment of credential-harvesting overlays

Social Engineering and Credential Theft Infrastructure

TCLBANKER incorporates a sophisticated social engineering framework based on Windows Presentation Foundation (WPF) full-screen overlays designed to imitate legitimate system interfaces and banking workflows.

The overlay framework supports multiple deceptive interfaces, including:

  • Fake credential entry prompts
  • Voice-phishing waiting screens
  • Fraudulent progress indicators
  • Counterfeit Windows Update interfaces

One particularly notable capability is that these overlays are intentionally hidden from many screen capture utilities, complicating incident response and user reporting efforts.

Worm Propagation Through WhatsApp and Outlook

In parallel with the banking trojan component, the malware activates a worm module that spreads through both messaging and email platforms.

WhatsApp Web Propagation

The malware hijacks the victim’s authenticated WhatsApp Web session and leverages the open-source WPPConnect library to automatically distribute malicious messages containing the trojanized installer. The worm excludes:

  • Group chats
  • Broadcast lists
  • Non-Brazilian phone numbers

This selective filtering increases operational efficiency while reducing unwanted exposure.

Outlook-Based Email Distribution

TCLBANKER also abuses the victim’s locally installed Microsoft Outlook client to send phishing emails directly from the victim’s legitimate mailbox. Because the messages originate from trusted infrastructure and authenticated user accounts, they are significantly more likely to bypass traditional email filtering and reputation-based detection systems.

Researchers estimate the malware can distribute itself to as many as 3,000 contacts through these combined propagation methods, making it highly effective for large-scale regional distribution campaigns.

Operational Assessment and Threat Outlook

Elastic researchers believe REF3076 remains in relatively early operational development stages. Indicators supporting this assessment include:

  • Debug logging artifacts
  • Test process names
  • Incomplete phishing infrastructure discovered within the codebase

These findings suggest active ongoing development and likely future expansion of capabilities.

The emergence of TCLBANKER also highlights the broader evolution of the Brazilian banking malware ecosystem. Techniques previously associated primarily with advanced threat actors are increasingly appearing in financially motivated crimeware operations. These capabilities now include:

  • Environment-aware payload decryption
  • Direct syscall generation
  • Real-time WebSocket-based operator interaction
  • Advanced social engineering overlays
  • Multi-channel worm propagation

This progression demonstrates a significant increase in operational maturity among banking trojan operators and reinforces the growing convergence between traditional cybercrime and advanced intrusion tradecraft.